UPDATE #3: This piece is far less optimistic about a revolt against Hamas in Gaza. We will see. Maybe the Palestinians really do have a death wish.
UPDATE #2: Hamas is aware of PA participation in Israeli intelligence and is knee capping and killing “collaborators.
“Hamas is very nervous, because they feel that their end is nearing,” a senior Fatah official said. “They have been waging a brutal campaign against Fatah members in the Gaza Strip.”
Meanwhile, sources close to Hamas revealed over the weekend that the movement had “executed” more than 35 Palestinians who were suspected of collaborating with Israel and were being held in various Hamas security installations.
I’d say the strategy is working.
“UPDATE: The anti-Israel movement has created a fake video alleging Israeli attacks on civilians. As pointed out in the comment, this is not from the Gaza attack but from an earlier incident in which a Hamas truck carrying rockets in a Hamas rally exploded. Expect more of this as the battle goes on.
There was a lot of speculation about Israel’s campaign in Gaza on the Sunday talk shows today. Most of the comments are not particularly informed and use the theme of negotiations as if there was a chance of success. I try to get more informed opinions, when possible. Here is an example.
Quite a few pundits seem to think that Israel lacks a strategy in Gaza. But unlike the Lebanon war of 2006, this war has been planned in advance, and every stage has been war-gamed. Here is my read of Israel’s strategic plan, which lies behind “Operation Cast Lead.”
Israel’s long-term strategic goal is the elimination of Hamas control of Gaza. This is especially the goal of the Kadima and Labor parties, which are distinguished by their commitment to a negotiated final status agreement with the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas. The Hamas takeover in Gaza reduced Abbas to a provincial governor, who no longer represents effective authority in all the areas destined for a future Palestinian state. Hamas rule in Gaza is a bone in the throat of the “peace process“—one Israel is determined to remove.
In 2006, Ehud Barak was not part of the Olmert government and serious issues surfaced with the IDF, which had not fought a war in years. In this situation, Barak is the Defense Minister, although there are concerns that his background is Special Forces and not the traditional army.
After the Hamas takeover in June 2007, Israel imposed a regime of economic sanctions on Gaza, by constricting the flow of goods and materials into Gaza via its crossings to Israel. The idea was gradually to undermine the popularity of Hamas in Gaza, while at the same time bolstering Abbas. Israel enjoyed considerable success in this approach. While the diplomatic “peace process” with Abbas didn’t move very far, the West Bank enjoyed an economic boomlet, as Israel removed checkpoints and facilitated the movement of capital, goods, workers, and foreign tourists. So while Gaza languished under sanctions, with zero growth, the West Bank visibly prospered—reinforcing the message that “Islamic resistance” is a dead end.
There have been no attacks from the West Bank since this policy was instituted although the Wall has obviously contributed to Israeli security, as well.
Hamas in power, from the outset, sought to break out of what it has called the Israeli “siege” by firing rockets into Israel. Its quid pro quo was an end to Hamas rocket fire in exchange for a lifting of the Israeli “siege.” When Israel and Hamas reached an agreement for “calm” last June, Hamas hoped the sanctions would be lifted as well, and Israel did increase the flow through the crossing points, by about 50 percent. Fuel supplies were restored to previous levels. But Hamas was fully aware that sanctions were slowly eroding its base and contradicting its narrative that “resistance” pays. This is why it refused to renew the “calm” agreement after its six-month expiration, and renewed rocket fire.
Thus, the Hamas refusal to continue the “cease fire” was because it recognized that it was losing the long term cold war.
The Israeli operation is meant to impress on Hamas that there is something far worse than the sanctions—that Israel is capable of hunting Hamas on air, sea, and land, at tremendous cost to Hamas and minimal cost to Israel, while much of the world stands by, and parts of it (including some Arabs) quietly applaud. Israel’s aim is not to bring down Hamas at this stage, but to compel it to accept a cease-fire on Israel’s terms—terms that leave the sanctions in place.
Many Western and Arab governments see the logic of this. They would like to see Abbas and the Palestinian Authority back in authority over Gaza, thus restoring credibility to the “peace process.” Because they wish to see Hamas contained if not diminished, they have moved slowly or not at all to respond to calls for action to stop the fighting. The question now is how Israel turns its military moves into political moves that achieve the shared objectives of this coalition of convenience.
A hint of the solution Israel envisions comes from a senior Israeli diplomatic source: “Israel cannot agree that the only party responsible for implementing and regulating the cease-fire be Hamas.”
Thus, the basic strategy is the end of Hamas rule in Gaza, slowly if necessary or quickly if they can be routed in this campaign.
[T]he objective is gradually restoring Gaza to control by Abbas and the Palestinian Authority.
The long term goal is restoration of (a hopefully chastened) Palestinian Authority rule in Gaza and ultimately to a two-state solution, the traditional goal of the “peace process.” Hamas rejected the same process and demands the end of Israel. They will never be part of a two state solution. Corruption by the PA lead to the Hamas win in the legislative council elections in 2006. Then, they overthrew the PA in a coup in 2007.
The debacle in Gaza is a direct result of the policies advocated by Fatah’s ‘old guard’ – comprising its Central Committee, presidential advisers inherited from the Yassir Arafat era, and Mohammad Dahlan, the ambitious former head of the PA’s preventive security apparatus in Gaza, who is now Abbas’s national security adviser. They were also advocated by the US officials in charge of Palestine policy: the neo-conservative Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch. Their alliance delivered US support for the group that bore greatest responsibility for the nepotism and corruption that plagued the PA under Arafat and for impeding economic, administrative and security-sector reform following his death. These factors contributed to a sharp rise in lawlessness and crime, as well as a steep decline in public service delivery in 2004–05, and led directly to Hamas’s January 2006 electoral victory.
Hopefully, the PA has learned its lesson although, in the middle east, corruption is assumed.
Back to Kramer’s assessment.
It is the PA, for example, which could be reinserted at the Egyptian border crossing at Rafah (as already demanded by Egypt). It is the PA that could be given exclusive control of reconstruction budgets to repair damaged and destroyed ministries, mosques, and homes. (In the eventual reconstruction boom, Israel will hold all the cards: Gaza has no construction materials, and gravel, aggregate, and cement must be trucked in from Israel.) The premise is that if economic sanctions are to be lifted—and post-war Gaza will be desperately in need of all material things—it must only be through the agency of the PA. Finally, PA security forces could be reintroduced in a police capacity, as part of the “national” reconciliation. An envelope for this restoration of the PA could be provided by the international community.
Thus, the end game of the Israeli campaign is the restoration of the PA, not Israeli occupation of Gaza. I wish I could say that this was understood by most of the talking heads on TV this morning but I didn’t see it.
