We have been in Afghanistan for nearly 9 years. We invaded after 2001 and routed the Taliban with a combination of non-Pashtun forces and our own Special Forces and air power. That campaign was a success. Now we are engaged in a nation building and COIN campaign in an area that has never been a nation or even a town. Prior to the Soviet maneuvering which resulted in invasion in 1979, Afghanistan had consisted of a city, Kabul, with a civilized society, and the vast countryside ruled by tribes and hostile to any attempt at central control by Kabul. The rather successful policy by the “central government’ was to leave them alone. Eventually, Soviet forces decided to take control with a series of coups.
The first was in 1971.
The workers started to get organised and became very active in the industrial areas of the country; the demonstrations, which had begun on the campus of the University and in the secondary schools of Kabul, soon spread to the provinces: riots became more and more frequent; the King was openly criticized.
Moscow had a plan ready and in Kabul and army was being infiltrated by the “Parcham” group. A period of transition was necessary before a Marxist government could be established. Someone had to be found, who could, at the same time, be trusted b Moscow and accepted by the Afghan people, in order to replace the King who was gradually loosing his popularity. Only one person met all the requirements, and that was Daoud. After ten years away from the political scene, he was still ambitious and eager to regain power. To achieve this goal, he was to take the King’s place, even if that meant as President of the Republic only. The Russians were in a hurry to put an end to the monarchy, which they considered to be a major obstacle to their objectives.
An agreement was reached in 1971 between two officers belonging to the “Parcham” group (Moscow’s favourite) and Dr. Hassan Sharq who was acting on Daoud’s behalf.
The tragedy of Afghanistan began here but there had never been a real central government. There was Kabul and then the rest of the country. Afghanistan had actually severed relationships with Pakistan in 1961. Pakistan is no friend of a real Afghanistan as an independent country. Afghanistan does have some natural resources and some rudimentary efforts were made to develop them under the Soviets.
The Pashtuns are the dominant tribal group of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is a major obstacle to any solution of the Afghanistan problem. Pakistan was a political creation at the dissolution of the British control of India. It was poorly done and massive tragedy ensued. Kashmir is one of those mistakes but Pakistan is another in many ways. Perhaps it should have been Pashtunistan except that half the Pashtuns were in Afghanistan, which was about to severe relations with Pakistan.
Pakistan has fomented terrorism in India as part of its Cold War with its neighbor. Much of this is directed at Kashmir but some has been redirected, as in the Mumbai massacre which was originally directed at Kashmir. Pakistan is not a reliable ally.
Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies
In his monograph, Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies, Mullick observed what he described as a “duplicitous approach” in Pakistan’s insurgency policy:
* On the one hand, Pakistan has engaged in an effort to counter insurgency (COIN) within its own borders, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
* On the other hand, Pakistan has been fomenting insurgency (FOIN) across the border in Afghanistan.
* Mullick argued that this policy needs to be considered as part of a coherent Pakistani national security strategy to protect its territorial, economic, and geopolitical interests.
Pakistan is backing the Taliban in Afghanistan and fighting them in Pakistan. Some of this is Pashtun politics.
Mullick argued that Pakistan’s paradoxical COIN/FOIN strategy has undergone several evolutions. Two of these stages hold particular significance for U.S. interests in the region:
* 2001–2008: Pakistan pursued counterinsurgency campaigns against the Pakistan Taliban, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and separatists in Balochistan. However, Pakistan decided to “selectively target,” and eventually abet, Afghan Taliban, many of whom fled to FATA after the American invasion
* 2009: The Taliban violated a peace deal struck by the government in the Swat Valley and brought their forces within 60 miles of Islamabad. Deciding to regain control over the Valley, Pakistan Army and Special Forces pursued a “hybrid COIN strategy.”
Thus, Pakistan fights when it is threatened but supports the insurgency in Afghanistan, perhaps as a way of redirecting the young militants from its own territory.
Curtis and Tellis questioned whether Pakistan’s shift in emphasis from FOIN to COIN represented a real “paradigm shift” or whether it was merely a transient refinement. Curtis, in particular, objected to the amoral symmetry that Mullick perceives exists between COIN and FOIN in Pakistan’s national security calculus. Pakistan, Tellis further noted, continues to target militant groups selectively, and several prominent networks remain active in Pakistan. These include the Haqqani network based in northern Waziristan, the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and the Afghan Taliban. Tellis also emphasized that Pakistan has fomented terrorism in addition to insurgencies and that its efforts with regard to the former have historically been far more effective. To date, there appears to be little change with respect to Pakistan’s support for terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was responsible for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India..
Pakistan cannot be trusted and, in fact, may constitute an enemy as it drifts toward militant Islam. Turkey is on the same path. We have to be realistic about what is going on. Our natural ally here is India, a society that has chosen modernity and is pursuing education and commercial development, unlike its neighbor and enemy Pakistan.
Tags: Afghanistan, al qeada, Pakistan