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	<title>Comments on: A better explanation</title>
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	<link>http://abriefhistory.org/?p=737</link>
	<description>Mixed political and history blog</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 07 Sep 2010 00:37:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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		<title>By: allan</title>
		<link>http://abriefhistory.org/?p=737&#038;cpage=1#comment-94940</link>
		<dc:creator>allan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Apr 2009 00:12:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abriefhistory.org/?p=737#comment-94940</guid>
		<description>You might not see this if I put it in the Mark to Market thread, so here&#039;s another take on the subject I read this afternoon. It&#039;s not too far off this post really.


... Mike Mayo â€“ who recently left Deutsche Bank for Calyon Securities “ agrees the change in mark-to-market (MTM) accounting will do little to save the banks. He released a new report saying banks&#039; loan losses will exceed those during the Great Depression. According to Bloomberg, Mayo &quot;expects loan losses to increase to 3.5 percent by the end of 2010. Mortgage-related losses are about halfway to their peak, while credit card and consumer losses are only one-third of way to their expected highest levels.&quot;

The changes to MTM accounting will alter banks&#039; balance sheets by only one-third or less and will have no impact on &quot;the economics of bank troubles.&quot; Especially considering that loans have been marked down to only 98 cents on the dollar, on average....&quot;

Now regarding this post, it was my understanding that one of the reasons the dot.com bubble was not as pervasive as this current one was that it was mainly a US centric bubble, one that did not sweep through the global investment community. And too, the damage was largely extended only as far as stockholders since there was not a massive involvement of the bond market in dot.com companies as they were too new and without a viable credit base. The hot money came from an avalanche of IPOs. Plus, I think hedge funds back then actually did some hedging, leaving the debt business to the bond boys.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You might not see this if I put it in the Mark to Market thread, so here&#8217;s another take on the subject I read this afternoon. It&#8217;s not too far off this post really.</p>
<p>&#8230; Mike Mayo â€“ who recently left Deutsche Bank for Calyon Securities “ agrees the change in mark-to-market (MTM) accounting will do little to save the banks. He released a new report saying banks&#8217; loan losses will exceed those during the Great Depression. According to Bloomberg, Mayo &#8220;expects loan losses to increase to 3.5 percent by the end of 2010. Mortgage-related losses are about halfway to their peak, while credit card and consumer losses are only one-third of way to their expected highest levels.&#8221;</p>
<p>The changes to MTM accounting will alter banks&#8217; balance sheets by only one-third or less and will have no impact on &#8220;the economics of bank troubles.&#8221; Especially considering that loans have been marked down to only 98 cents on the dollar, on average&#8230;.&#8221;</p>
<p>Now regarding this post, it was my understanding that one of the reasons the dot.com bubble was not as pervasive as this current one was that it was mainly a US centric bubble, one that did not sweep through the global investment community. And too, the damage was largely extended only as far as stockholders since there was not a massive involvement of the bond market in dot.com companies as they were too new and without a viable credit base. The hot money came from an avalanche of IPOs. Plus, I think hedge funds back then actually did some hedging, leaving the debt business to the bond boys.</p>
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		<title>By: A Brief History… » Blog Archive » A better explanation</title>
		<link>http://abriefhistory.org/?p=737&#038;cpage=1#comment-94935</link>
		<dc:creator>A Brief History… » Blog Archive » A better explanation</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Apr 2009 22:49:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://abriefhistory.org/?p=737#comment-94935</guid>
		<description>[...] A Brief History… » Blog Archive » A better explanation [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] A Brief History… » Blog Archive » A better explanation [...]</p>
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