Archive for the ‘terrorism’ Category

A long and essential discussion of the Middle East.

Wednesday, August 25th, 2010

I have long read Michael J Totten and he is, in my opinion, the best person to explain the Middle East to Americans. Today, he has a long column on the Middle East which any thinking person should read to understand where we are right now.

If you read nothing else of this column, please read this. It explains so much. It is an interview of a young Israeli PhD scholar of middle east politics.

Jonathan Spyer: And what they have to face up to now—and you know this very well—is that the three most powerful countries in the Middle East are not Arab.

MJT: Yes.

Jonathan Spyer: Israel, Turkey, and Iran. This is difficult for Arabs to deal with.

MJT: Many have a hard time even admitting it. I pointed this out years ago and got all kinds of grief in my inbox from Arabs who said I had no idea what I was talking about.

Jonathan Spyer: I’m sure.

MJT: They said I’m a stupid American who knows nothing of the Middle East, but they’re in denial. The only Arab country calling shots right now is Syria, and that’s only because Bashar Assad is a sidekick of the Persians.

Jonathan Spyer: A Palestinian friend of mine just the other day was telling me how Turkey and Iran are competing with each other to be the standard bearer of the Palestinian cause. Iran, with its sponsorship of Hamas and Hezbollah, and Turkey, with its flotillas, are the two countries with all the creative ideas. What do the Arab states have next to that? Nothing. Arabism’s flagship cause is championed by two non-Arab states.

How Syria fits into all this is one of the biggest divides here in Israel. There are those in the defense establishment who believe Assad’s championship of the resistance is entirely cynical and instrumental, and they want to pry him away from Iran.

MJT: His foreign policy is just instrumental and cynical, but I don’t believe for a minute he can be pried away from Iran.

Jonathan Spyer: I don’t either. And I’m glad that the people around the prime minister don’t buy it.

MJT: How do you know they don’t buy it?

Jonathan Spyer: Because I know some of them. The people around Netanyahu don’t believe this is possible.

MJT: I’m glad to hear that, because I’ve met lots of Israelis who do. And I think they’re crazy to think that. A lot of Israelis simply do not understand Syria.

Jonathan Spyer: Absolutely. They aren’t naïve people by any means. On the contrary. But they find it very hard to except the irrational and ideological elements in Middle East politics. They themselves are not irrational or ideological. They’re extremely rational, and they assume everyone else is, as well. And so they make massive errors.

MJT: It’s a common problem all over the world. Lots of people assume everyone else is just like themselves. Americans often assume most people in the Arab world want what we have. I’ve met plenty of Arabs who believe the United States is involved in these dark conspiracies like their own governments are.

Jonathan Spyer: Yes. Arabs often think they’re being mature and sophisticated by talking this way, but in order to have a proper, grown-up, three-dimensional understanding of American foreign policy you need to understand that the idea of America is one of the things that informs American foreign policy. If you don’t understand that, you won’t be able to understand what the U.S. is doing and why.

And some of the planners and thinkers here in Israel still believe that everyone at the end of the day wants the same things they want. That isn’t the case, and you will make grave errors if you assume that it is. I’m not a fan of Netanyahu’s prime ministership down the line, but he does have people around him who understand the role ideas play in this region. It stops us from making the kinds of errors that, for example, Ehud Barak made in 2000.

MJT: I thought Barak’s withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon was the right thing to do, and so was offering Arafat a Palestinian state. I supported both, and I still do even in hindsight, but we have to be honest about the results of those policies. War followed both, and Israelis will have to be extremely careful about withdrawing from the West Bank and the eastern half of Jerusalem.

Jonathan Spyer: Absolutely. Many people still say we all know what the final settlement is going to look like, so we just need to get the two sides together and work it out. To that I say, “No. You don’t know what the final status is going to look like. The final status you have in mind is what you came up with by negotiating with yourself.”

I was an early skeptic of the Oslo peace process.

MJT: Why? I wasn’t, but you were right and I was wrong. What did you see then that I didn’t?

Jonathan Spyer: We all get things wrong in the Middle East, but that time I was right. I’m not saying I was some kind of genius—I was just a kid—but I did manage to call that one for whatever it’s worth.

All you had to do at the time was be interested enough in Arab political culture to listen carefully to what the other side said. That’s all it took. Once you did that, you’d have to be a moron not to see what was coming. Most people weren’t doing that.

Hezbollah erected a billboard on the border facing south into Israel showing a severed head being held by its hair. Text in Hebrew says, Sharon, don’t forget. Your soldiers are still in Lebanon.

MJT: It’s the same in the U.S. today. Too many people don’t want to listen to what’s being said in the Arab world. A lot of it is deeply disturbing. I could be wrong, and I don’t like to psychoanalyze people, but I think that’s the problem. They’re afraid of the implications of all this crazy talk in the Middle East. So they pretend they don’t hear it, they explain it away, or they say it’s not serious.

Jonathan Spyer: I think that’s right.

MJT: I don’t like what I often hear either, and I don’t know what we should do about it, but I’m aware of it, and it’s there whether I like it or not.

Jonathan Spyer: That’s the bottom line. And from there you have to build a rational policy. You may not like it, but what else can you do?

Israelis were exhausted by a half-century of war before the peace process started. Every family in the country was shaped by it. There was an immense longing in the 1990s for peace, normalcy, and the good life. We had an intense will and longing for that. So when the Oslo crowd came to town and said, “You can be born again, you can have peace with the Arabs,” people bought into it.

They were idealists, and they were rationalists. If a note of triumphalism creeps into my voice, it’s only because I remember how arrogant they were during the 1990s when they thought they were right. They were extremely contemptuous toward everyone at the time who was trying to warn them. We were described as anachronisms from a different century.

MJT: That’s what I thought at the time.

Jonathan Spyer: Okay. Fine. It’s okay.

MJT: I was young. I wasn’t writing about the Middle East then.

Jonathan Spyer: Sure. It’s fine. Everyone gets this place wrong.

MJT: No one has ever been right consistently. I don’t think it’s possible.

Jonathan Spyer: It’s not.

MJT: This place is too weird.

Jonathan Spyer: [Laughs.] Yeah. It is.

MJT: It took me years to understand how this place works just on the most basic level because it’s so different from the part of the world I grew up in. I first had to stop assuming Arabs think like Americans. Then I had to learn how they think differently from Americans. I still don’t fully understand them, and I probably never will.

Jonathan Spyer: It’s hard. I used to try to figure it out by extrapolating from the Jewish experience, but it doesn’t work. Their response to events is totally different. It’s useless. You have to throw this sort of thinking into the trash or you can’t understand anything.

MJT: When the U.S. went into Iraq, I thought Iraqis would react the way I would have if I were Iraqi.

Jonathan Spyer: Sure.

MJT: But they didn’t. But I wasn’t only projecting. I knew they weren’t exactly like me. They’re Iraqis. I guess I expected the Arabs of Iraq to react the way the Kurds of Iraq did, and the Kurds reacted the way I would have reacted. But the Arab world isn’t America, and it is not Kurdistan.

MJT: The Arab world has its own political culture, and it’s not like the political culture I know, or even like other Middle Eastern political cultures.

If the Palestinians had a Western political culture, the problem here could be resolved in ten minutes. If you Israelis were dealing with Canadians instead of Palestinians, you would have had peace a long time ago. And if the Palestinians were dealing with Canadians instead of Israelis, there would still be a conflict.

Jonathan Spyer: That’s exactly right. And that’s why it’s so frustrating sometimes when people say, “If only the two sides could sit down and talk.”

This is why the people who worry that the GZM controversy will affect how Muslims think about Americans, are foolish. The GZM controversy is a pimple on the ass of the issues between Islam and the West. The sooner we understand this, the less chance of catastrophic error.

The Ground Zero Mosque

Thursday, August 19th, 2010

I think that about says it.

Maybe one more comment. Some of the ruling class apologists have said there are other mosques in the area so what’s the big deal ? The answer, I think, is pretty clear. To quote:

Tribeca Tavern owner Greg Kosovoi said that for 10 years he was unaware that a mosque was next door. Eric Benn, co-owner of the 11-year-old Bubble Lounge, said the same.

‘None of us knew there was a mosque there,’ he said. ‘What kind of research are we supposed to do? Do we knock on every single door?’

The building at 245 West Broadway, open for services twice a week, has no signage other than the following four lines, in small print, on the door:

Dergah/Nur Ashki Jurahai/Sufi Order/Masjid al-Farah

A report written by an SLA investigator and obtained by the Trib concludes that the building is indeed a mosque, but states: ‘There are no signs or any indication that there is a Mosque located in the building.’

It’s not the mosque, it’s the symbolism.

Pakistan is an unreliable ally

Saturday, July 3rd, 2010

We have been in Afghanistan for nearly 9 years. We invaded after 2001 and routed the Taliban with a combination of non-Pashtun forces and our own Special Forces and air power. That campaign was a success. Now we are engaged in a nation building and COIN campaign in an area that has never been a nation or even a town. Prior to the Soviet maneuvering which resulted in invasion in 1979, Afghanistan had consisted of a city, Kabul, with a civilized society, and the vast countryside ruled by tribes and hostile to any attempt at central control by Kabul. The rather successful policy by the “central government’ was to leave them alone. Eventually, Soviet forces decided to take control with a series of coups.

The first was in 1971.

The workers started to get organised and became very active in the industrial areas of the country; the demonstrations, which had begun on the campus of the University and in the secondary schools of Kabul, soon spread to the provinces: riots became more and more frequent; the King was openly criticized.

Moscow had a plan ready and in Kabul and army was being infiltrated by the “Parcham” group. A period of transition was necessary before a Marxist government could be established. Someone had to be found, who could, at the same time, be trusted b Moscow and accepted by the Afghan people, in order to replace the King who was gradually loosing his popularity. Only one person met all the requirements, and that was Daoud. After ten years away from the political scene, he was still ambitious and eager to regain power. To achieve this goal, he was to take the King’s place, even if that meant as President of the Republic only. The Russians were in a hurry to put an end to the monarchy, which they considered to be a major obstacle to their objectives.

An agreement was reached in 1971 between two officers belonging to the “Parcham” group (Moscow’s favourite) and Dr. Hassan Sharq who was acting on Daoud’s behalf.

The tragedy of Afghanistan began here but there had never been a real central government. There was Kabul and then the rest of the country. Afghanistan had actually severed relationships with Pakistan in 1961. Pakistan is no friend of a real Afghanistan as an independent country. Afghanistan does have some natural resources and some rudimentary efforts were made to develop them under the Soviets.

The Pashtuns are the dominant tribal group of Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is a major obstacle to any solution of the Afghanistan problem. Pakistan was a political creation at the dissolution of the British control of India. It was poorly done and massive tragedy ensued. Kashmir is one of those mistakes but Pakistan is another in many ways. Perhaps it should have been Pashtunistan except that half the Pashtuns were in Afghanistan, which was about to severe relations with Pakistan.

Pakistan has fomented terrorism in India as part of its Cold War with its neighbor. Much of this is directed at Kashmir but some has been redirected, as in the Mumbai massacre which was originally directed at Kashmir. Pakistan is not a reliable ally.

Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies

In his monograph, Pakistan’s Security Paradox: Countering and Fomenting Insurgencies, Mullick observed what he described as a “duplicitous approach” in Pakistan’s insurgency policy:

* On the one hand, Pakistan has engaged in an effort to counter insurgency (COIN) within its own borders, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

* On the other hand, Pakistan has been fomenting insurgency (FOIN) across the border in Afghanistan.

* Mullick argued that this policy needs to be considered as part of a coherent Pakistani national security strategy to protect its territorial, economic, and geopolitical interests.

Pakistan is backing the Taliban in Afghanistan and fighting them in Pakistan. Some of this is Pashtun politics.

Mullick argued that Pakistan’s paradoxical COIN/FOIN strategy has undergone several evolutions. Two of these stages hold particular significance for U.S. interests in the region:

* 2001–2008: Pakistan pursued counterinsurgency campaigns against the Pakistan Taliban, Al Qaeda and its affiliates, and separatists in Balochistan. However, Pakistan decided to “selectively target,” and eventually abet, Afghan Taliban, many of whom fled to FATA after the American invasion

* 2009: The Taliban violated a peace deal struck by the government in the Swat Valley and brought their forces within 60 miles of Islamabad. Deciding to regain control over the Valley, Pakistan Army and Special Forces pursued a “hybrid COIN strategy.”

Thus, Pakistan fights when it is threatened but supports the insurgency in Afghanistan, perhaps as a way of redirecting the young militants from its own territory.

Curtis and Tellis questioned whether Pakistan’s shift in emphasis from FOIN to COIN represented a real “paradigm shift” or whether it was merely a transient refinement. Curtis, in particular, objected to the amoral symmetry that Mullick perceives exists between COIN and FOIN in Pakistan’s national security calculus. Pakistan, Tellis further noted, continues to target militant groups selectively, and several prominent networks remain active in Pakistan. These include the Haqqani network based in northern Waziristan, the Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, and the Afghan Taliban. Tellis also emphasized that Pakistan has fomented terrorism in addition to insurgencies and that its efforts with regard to the former have historically been far more effective. To date, there appears to be little change with respect to Pakistan’s support for terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was responsible for the 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India..

Pakistan cannot be trusted and, in fact, may constitute an enemy as it drifts toward militant Islam. Turkey is on the same path. We have to be realistic about what is going on. Our natural ally here is India, a society that has chosen modernity and is pursuing education and commercial development, unlike its neighbor and enemy Pakistan.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

Sunday, June 13th, 2010

UPDATE #3: The new issue of Rolling Stone (Not out yet) has an article about General McChrystal and his aides who contemptuous of President Obama and his people such as Richard Holbroke and the Ambassador Eikenberry. All hell has broken loose in the White House and McChrystal has been called back to Washington to explain.

UPDATE #2: This may be old news being pushed by the administration in a bit of cheer leading. The original studies were published in 2007. This sort of thing may be the reason.

UPDATE: It now appears there are large deposits of minerals, especially Lithium, in Afghanistan. Given the neighbors of the country, I doubt this will be a benefit for a very long time, if ever.

A month or two ago I suggested it is time to get out of Afghanistan. There are serious problems with any effort to build a modern nation in Afghanistan. It has no assets in terms of natural resources or a history of a middle class. It is also a part of the sphere of influence of Pakistan which is frustrating our efforts by supporting the Taliban at the same time it is giving lip service to our war on the same entity. The fact is that the Taliban is a creature of Pakistan’s ISI, the intelligence service of the country which is more Islamist than the supposed democratic government.

India, which is our natural ally in the region, is reporting that the ISI is supporting them almost openly.

ISI provides funding, training and sanctuary to Taliban in Afghanistan on a scale much larger than previously thought, a report claims and suggests that the spy agency may be backing the insurgents to undermine Indian influence in the war-torn country. The report by the London School of Economics (LSE), based on interviews with nine Taliban commanders in Afghanistan between February and May this year, says the support for the Afghan Taliban was “official ISI policy”.

The IED explosives that resist detection by mine detectors are supplied to the Taliban by Pakistan. These IEDs are now the principle tactic of the Taliban.

“They have conducted less direct fire attacks from the winter into this spring, and they’re using more IEDs, suicide vests and potentially a car bomb,” he said.

As an example he cited last month’s suicide attack against the US-operated Bagram air base outside Kabul, and a suicide car bombing by the Taliban the previous day which killed at least 18 people, including six NATO troops – five U.S. and one Canadian.

The Bagram attack “was really not one that I think could have achieved success in terms of penetrating the base itself,” Scaparrotti said.

Yet it sparked hours of battles, left an American contractor and 10 militants dead, and highlighted the increasing sophistication and relentless pace of the conflict in which the Taliban are waging an insurgency to overthrow the U.S.-backed government of President Hamid Karzai.

It is now known that Pakistan, through the ISI, is now paying families of suicide bombers 200,000 Pakistani Rupees, about $1,000. This was a tactic of Saddam Hussein when he provided $25,000 stipends to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. In a society where young men have few options for successful careers in real work, the sums are a real incentive.

“Although the Taliban has a strong endogenous impetus, according to Taliban commanders the ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the movement,” wrote author Matt Waldman, a fellow at Harvard University.
“They say it gives sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies. In their words, this is ‘as clear as the sun in the sky’.”
Waldman said the ISI appears to exert “significant influence” on strategic decision-making and field operations of the Taliban and controls the most violent insurgent units, some of which appear to be based in Pakistan.
Insurgent commanders claimed the ISI — an acronym for Inter-Services Intelligence directorate — was even officially represented, as participants or observers, on the Taliban supreme leadership council, he said.
The report alleges that Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari himself had assured captive senior Taliban leaders that they were “our people” and had his backing. He had apparently authorised some to be released from prison.
The study drew an angry reaction from the Pakistani military.
“It is a part of a malicious campaign against the Pakistan army and the ISI,” Pakistan army spokesman Major General Athar Abbas told AFP.

The enemy we are fighting in Afghanistan is actually Pakistan and our aid to Pakistan is being used to fund our enemy in the field. This is worse than Vietnam where the enemy had sanctuary in supposedly neutral territory. Here, the enemy has sanctuary in our putative ally. We need to recognize this and get out. The enemy is Pakistan and our ally is India.

The recent expulsion of Michael Yon from Afghanistan is part of the delusion we are under in what is happening.

The intention was to write a detailed dispatch on the 3-17th Field Artillerly. Unfortunately, General Stanley McChrystals’ crew broke an agreement I had with the Army to stay until 5/2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team leaves Afghanistan, and so the research on this dispatch was not completed. However, there are some nice nighttime photos and so this dispatch is more about Canons than cannons.

He has incurred the displeasure of General McChrystal. The battle for Kandahar has been delayed and will probably not be successful. The expulsion of the best battlefield reporter we have is suspicious and suggests an effort to conceal the truth.

This is a political war on nearly every level. Though this will almost certainly be our most deadly year so far, violence is often a minor aspect of the struggle, while in some places combat is—by far—the most prevalent feature. Insofar as combat, our plans do not include serious fighting within Kandahar City, though soon after publication of this dispatch fighting will erupt in nearby areas. BfK is more of a process for both sides than a set battle. The Taliban are succeeding in their process to take Kandahar, and we wish to reverse that process.

The war is going to bring heavy casualties and I do not see the value of the struggle as we have committed to leaving next year, which makes the effort even less worth the cost.

Five weeks

Monday, February 15th, 2010

The “Christmas Day bomber” was interrogated for 50 minutes and then given his Miranda rights warning and allowed to retain a lawyer. He immediately stopped talking to the FBI. The President, from his vacation spot in Hawaii, described him as “an isolated extremist.” In fact, he was not isolated at all. After weeks of trying to defend the decision to treat him as a common criminal, the administration announced that he was talking after all and that his family had convinced him to cooperate. The FBI had briefed the Congressional intelligence committee members that he had begun to talk but warned them that this was top secret so that associates would not be warned. The next day, the White House began blathering about his cooperation and the blather has continued. On This Week, Sunday, Peter Beinart, a left wing blogger, was gushing about how much the “underpants bombers” was telling the administration. There is one problem. The five week delay allowed the other terrorists trained with him to scatter.

U.S. and allied counterterrorism authorities have launched a global manhunt for English-speaking terrorists trained in Yemen who are planning attacks on the United States, based on intelligence provided by the suspect in the attempted Christmas Day bombing after he began cooperating.

U.S. officials told The Washington Times that Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, facing charges as a would-be suicide bomber, revealed during recent cooperation with the FBI that he met with other English speakers at a terrorist training camp in Yemen. Three U.S. intelligence officials, including one senior official, disclosed on the condition of anonymity some details of the additional bomb plots.

One of the administration’s useful idiots announced last DEcember that the 50 minute interrogation had provided all the intelligence they needed. Well, I guess that story is no longer operative.

The data about the additional terrorist plots is thought to be one factor behind alarming congressional testimony two weeks ago from senior U.S. intelligence officials, including Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair.

Mr. Blair said he was “certain” that it was al Qaeda’s priority to attempt an attack on the United States within three to six months.

That can’t possibly be correct because Vice-President Joe Biden announced Sunday on several news shows that another attack was “unlikely.” Who are you going to believe, the DNE or the VP ?

Vice President Joe Biden made his latest eyebrow-furrowing prediction Wednesday night, declaring confidently that another Sept. 11-size terror attack is “unlikely” in the U.S., despite signs that Al Qaeda and and other terrorist groups are actively planning more attacks.

I guess it depends on your definition of “massive.” One airliner is no big deal to Joe.

An analysis of the CIA disaster in Afghanistan.

Monday, January 11th, 2010

Stratfor analyzes the successful Taliban suicide attack against the the CIA in Khost last month.

As Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi exited the vehicle that brought him onto Forward Operating Base (FOB) Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan, on Dec. 30, 2009, security guards noticed he was behaving strangely. They moved toward al-Balawi and screamed demands that he take his hand out of his pocket, but instead of complying with the officers’ commands, al-Balawi detonated the suicide device he was wearing. The explosion killed al-Balawi, three security contractors, four CIA officers and the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) officer who was al-Balawi’s handler. The vehicle shielded several other CIA officers at the scene from the blast. The CIA officers killed included the chief of the base at Khost and an analyst from headquarters who reportedly was the agency’s foremost expert on al Qaeda. The agency’s second-ranking officer in Afghanistan was allegedly among the officers who survived.

The CIA officers clearly violated tradecraft in this incident, which makes me wonder what else they were weak in. I am just not impressed with the CIA, especially in analysis. They attacked George Bush more successfully than they did the Islamists. I reviewed Timmerman’s book a couple of years ago. I wish I had more confidence in this institution.

More Obama diplomacy

Friday, December 25th, 2009

UPDATE #2: More evidence of Obama’s diplomatic priorities as the US releases 100 Iranian backed terrorists for one British hostage.

The US military has freed Qais Qazali, the leader of the Asaib al Haq, or League of the Righteous, as well as his brother Laith, several Qods Force officers, and more than 100 members of the terror group, in exchange for Moore. And that isn’t all. The British also received the corpses of three security contractors who were working to protect Moore when he was kidnapped at the Finance Ministry in Baghdad in May 2007. The three contractors were executed by the Asaib al Haq; another is also thought to have been killed.
Qais Qazli wasn’t just some run of the mill Shia thug; his group is backed by Iran. Qazali’s men were trained by Iranian Qods Force to infiltrate and assault the Provincial Joint Coordination Center in Karbala in January 2007. Five US soldiers were killed during the kidnapping attempt. The US soldiers were executed after US and Iraqi security forces closed in on the assault team.

Iranian civilians try to overthrow the tyranny while Obama supports them.

UPDATE: Fouad Ajami has more to say about Obama’s diplomacy.

US diplomatic cars are refusing to identify the occupants at Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank. They have been caught transporting a Palestinian without identification or permission between Israel and the West Bank. The most recent incident was when they attempted to run over an Israeli guard.

A dispute is rumbling between Israel and the US Consulate in Jerusalem after a US diplomatic car allegedly tried running over a Defense Ministry security guard recently at an IDF checkpoint in the West Bank. The car had been stopped after the occupants refused to present identification papers.

Israel is also furious that one of the consulate cars was found to have transported a Palestinian without permits between Jerusalem and the West Bank.

The identification of American diplomats from the consulate at IDF checkpoints has been a major sticking point for several years.

In January 2008, the Civil Administration of Judea and Samaria filed complaints with the Foreign Ministry after both US Security Coordinator Lt.-Gen. Keith Dayton and then-consul-general Jacob Walles refused to roll down their windows or open their car doors and show identification papers at a checkpoint.

However, Israel’s ire reached a new level after an incident on November 13 in which a five-car convoy of consulate vehicles with diplomatic plates arrived at the Gilboa crossing.

According to a detailed official Israel Police description of the incident obtained exclusively by The Jerusalem Post, the drivers refused to identify themselves or open a window or door. The drivers, according to the report, purposely blocked the crossing, tried running over one of the Israeli security guards stationed there and made indecent gestures at female guards.

The entire incident was documented by cameras at the crossing.

Maybe Obama plans to ally himself with Iran and declare war on Israel. He seems to have allied himself with Venezuela in the Honduras incident. More and more, he is going out on a limb with the American people. Of course, the Arabist State Department was doing this before he was elected but I expect them to be emboldened now.

More results from Obama’s foreign policy. Sickening.

Lebanese Prime Minster Saad Hariri just spent two days with Syrian strongman Bashar Assad in Damascus, and you’d think from reading the wire reports that Lebanon and Syria had re-established normal relations after a rough patch. That’s how it’s being reported, but it’s nonsense. Hariri went to Damascus with Hezbollah’s bayonet in his back.
Assad’s regime assassinated Saad Hariri’s father, Rafik, in 2005 for just gingerly opposing Syria’s occupation of Lebanon. There is no alternate universe where Saad Hariri is OK with this or where his generically “positive” statements at a press conference were anything other than forced.

And the reason ?

No one has Hariri’s or Lebanon’s back, not anymore. He and his allies in the “March 14″ coalition have sensed this for some time, which is why Druze leader Walid Jumblatt has grudgingly softened his opposition to Assad and Hezbollah lately. When Hariri went to Damascus, everyone in the country, aside from useless newswire reporters, understood it meant Syria has re-emerged as the strong horse in Lebanon.

How many more of Bush’s wins can this president reverse ?

Why I think we should get out of Afghanistan

Wednesday, December 9th, 2009

I was in favor of the Iraq invasion in 2003 and, although the post-war period was botched, I think the Surge has made it a modest success. Iraq was always a better bet than Afghanistan because it is a rich country and had a modest middle class already. In fact, I think Iraq has a good chance to become the most successful Arab state. On the other hand, I think Afghanistan is a very risky situation.

During Afghanistan’s golden age which consisted of the last king’s rule, the country consisted of a small civilized center in Kabul while the rest of the country existed much as it did in the time of Alexander the Great. I have reviewed Kilcullen’s Accidental Guerilla, which explains much of the Afghan war. He is not optimistic about it and neither am I. Aside from the fact that Obama is a reluctant, very reluctant, warrior here, Pakistan is a serious obstacle to success.

Today, Andy McCarthy calls our attention to an explosive editorial in Investors’ Business Daily on the links between the Taliban and Pakistan’s army and intelligence services.

it’s an open secret the Taliban are headquartered across the border in the city of Quetta, Pakistan, where they operate openly under the aegis of Pakistani intelligence — and the financial sponsorship of the Saudis.

Sending more troops to Afghanistan is a necessary, albeit unfortunate, rear-guard action against marauding Taliban fighters armed, trained, supplied and deployed from Quetta — and funded from Riyadh.

NATO and U.S. military command know this. They’ve complained about it over and over in military action reports. So have Treasury officials regarding Saudi funding of the Taliban.

“Saudi Arabia today remains the location where more money is going to terrorism — to Sunni terror groups and the Taliban — than any other place in the world,” testified Stuart Levey, Treasury undersecretary.

This is Viet Nam all over again. The enemy has a sanctuary and our allies are siding secretly with our enemies.

Here’s how the game works. The Pakistanis are currently engaged in a much heralded crackdown on jihadists. But they are limiting those operations to the jihadists in the northwest tribal region — i.e., those whose primary target is the Pakistani government. By contrast, the Taliban — i.e., the jihadists targeting the U.S. and Afghanistan — are holed up in Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, under the protection of the ISI. In fact, there are now reports that Mullah Omar has been moved to Karachi to protect him from U.S. drone attacks.

Pakistan is playing a double game. Secondly, our troops are handicapped by absurd rules of engagement.

The Times compiled an informal list of the new rules from interviews with U.S. forces. Among them:

• No night or surprise searches.

• Villagers have to be warned prior to searches.

• ANA or ANP must accompany U.S. units on searches.

• U.S. soldiers may not fire at the enemy unless the enemy is preparing to fire first.

• U.S. forces cannot engage the enemy if civilians are present.

This is ridiculous. Pakistan is protecting the enemy and our troops are restricted to idiotic limits, such as warning hostile villages before attacks. We should leave.

Then, if things deteriorate, Pakistan may become the target instead of Afghanistan.

Promises, promises

Monday, November 16th, 2009

I don’t know that I need to add anything. Others have explained this very well.

Trying KSM in civilian court will be an intelligence bonanza for al Qaeda and the hostile nations that will view the U.S. intelligence methods and sources that such a trial will reveal. The proceedings will tie up judges for years on issues best left to the president and Congress.

Whether a jury ultimately convicts KSM and his fellows, or sentences them to death, is beside the point. The treatment of the 9/11 attacks as a criminal matter rather than as an act of war will cripple American efforts to fight terrorism. It is in effect a declaration that this nation is no longer at war.

Andy McCarthy, who tried the 1993 WTC bombers says, “During the 1993 World Trade Center bombing trial of Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman (aka the “blind Sheikh”), standard criminal trial rules required the government to turn over to the defendants a list of 200 possible co-conspirators.

In essence, this list was a sketch of American intelligence on al Qaeda.”

According to Mr. McCarthy, who tried the case, it was delivered to bin Laden in Sudan on a silver platter within days of its production as a court exhibit.

Bin Laden, who was on the list, could immediately see who was compromised. He also could start figuring out how American intelligence had learned its information and anticipate what our future moves were likely to be.

Oh well. I don’t understand Obama and am a bit afraid of what I would find if I did.

How to win in Afghanistan

Sunday, November 8th, 2009

There is an essay, actually a pamphlet, that explains a strategy to win in Afghanistan. The author is a Special Forces major who has been there, and in Iraq, for years and who seems to know what he is writing about. I doubt it will happen but it is worth reading. It’s interesting that it is on Steven Pressfield’s blog. For those unfamiliar with his novels, you should read some of them. I suspect his novel about Alexander’s campaign in Afghanistan is based on real life experience the past nine years. The pamphlet also agrees with my idea that the campaign against the poppy is doomed.

It is a pdf document and is worth reading.